Working in New York City: your rights under the NYC Human Rights Law

Who does the City law cover?

Where you work matters more than where you live. The City law protects people who work in New York City. If you live and work somewhere else, you have to show that the discrimination had an impact inside the City; a decision made at a Manhattan headquarters is not enough by itself (Hoffman v Parade Publications, 15 N.Y.3d 285, 289–92 (2010), dismissing the claims of an employee who lived and worked in Georgia). Remote work, and applicants for jobs based in the City who live elsewhere, are covered in more detail in what if I live or work outside New York?

Employer size. Most of the City law’s employment protections apply only to an employer with at least four people working for it. The count includes independent contractors working in the business, and the employer’s parent, spouse, domestic partner or child if they work there. The four must have been there throughout the period from twelve months before the discrimination began until it ended. A claim of gender-based harassment is different: it reaches every employer, whatever its size (Admin. Code § 8-102, definition of “employer”).

The four-person minimum is written into the definition of “employer” for a specific list of the law’s provisions, including the main ban on discrimination. Some provisions, such as the ones on retaliation, disability accommodation and the cooperative dialogue, are not on that list. Whether a smaller employer can be liable under those is not settled; see the notes for lawyers. If your employer has fewer than four people, get advice before you assume you have no City claim.

Interns, freelancers and independent contractors. “The protections of this chapter relating to employees apply to interns, freelancers and independent contractors” (Admin. Code § 8-107(23)). Interns are covered whether or not they are paid (§ 8-102). If you are paid on a 1099, you are not outside the City law for that reason.

Domestic workers are protected whatever the size of the household that employs them, though a few provisions, including the Fair Chance Act rules, do not apply to them (§ 8-107(23)).

Public employers. The City law covers government employers and public authorities, not just private businesses. The Court of Appeals held that the New York City Transit Authority is subject to the City Commission’s jurisdiction over an employee’s sexual harassment complaint (Matter of Levy v City Commn. on Human Rights, 85 N.Y.2d 740, 744–46 (1995)). The Transit Authority later argued that Public Authorities Law § 1266(8) exempts it from local laws; the Second Department rejected that argument in a City law retaliation case against the Transit Authority (Tang v New York City Tr. Auth., 55 A.D.3d 720, 720–21 (2d Dep’t 2008)), and the First Department rejected it for the MTA and the Transit Authority in a subway accessibility case (Center for Independence of the Disabled v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 184 A.D.3d 197, 207–08 (1st Dep’t 2020)). If you work for the City of New York itself, note the limit on punitive damages under what can I recover? Employers created by an interstate compact, such as the Port Authority, raise separate questions this page does not cover.

Why the City law is different: liberal construction

In 2005 the City Council passed the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act because it believed courts had been reading the City law as if it were federal law. The law now tells courts to construe it “liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal or New York state civil and human rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to provisions of this title, have been so construed,” and to read its exceptions and exemptions narrowly (Admin. Code § 8-130(a)–(b)).

In 2016 the Council went further and named three decisions as correctly applying that rule (§ 8-130(c)):

• Albunio v City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472, 477–79 (2011). The Court of Appeals held that the City law must be construed “broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible,” and upheld a jury verdict for two police officers on their retaliation claims.
• Bennett v Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 92 A.D.3d 29, 40–45 (1st Dep’t 2011). The First Department held that a court deciding summary judgment on a City law claim should ask whether any reasonable jury could find for the employee under any theory, and that evidence the employer’s explanation is false should almost always send the case to a jury. The employer still won: the evidence of the worker’s poor performance was unrebutted and he offered nothing showing it was a pretext.
• “The majority opinion in” Williams v New York City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 66–80 (1st Dep’t 2009). The First Department held that the City law requires its own analysis in every case, with federal and State law as a minimum rather than a limit, and that harassment need not be “severe or pervasive.” The employer won that case too: the worker’s retaliation claim failed, and the only remarks within the limitations period were a single occasion, not directed at her, that she herself saw as partly complimentary; an earlier comment was time-barred.

What this means for your case. A City law claim has to be analyzed on its own, even when it is brought alongside federal and State claims. The Second Circuit has told federal judges exactly that: courts “must analyze NYCHRL claims separately and independently from any federal and state law claims” (Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux North America, Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013), sending a sexual harassment and retaliation case back for trial). The Second Department held that a trial court erred by analyzing the State and City claims together, and reinstated one City claim (Golston-Green v City of New York, 184 A.D.3d 24, 35, 45 (2d Dep’t 2020)).

Where it stops. Liberal construction does not rewrite the words of the law. The Court of Appeals has said twice that a broad construction “must be reasonable and grounded in the language of the local law.” It held that a supervisor or owner is not personally an “employer” under the City law (Doe v Bloomberg L.P., 36 N.Y.3d 450, 459, 462 (2021)), and that “marital status” means being single, married, separated, divorced or widowed, not being in a relationship with a particular person (Matter of McCabe v 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp., 43 N.Y.3d 365, 371–78 (2024), a housing case decided 5–2). So far, the Court of Appeals has used liberal construction to decide how a claim is proved, not to add categories or defendants the Council did not write, though McCabe left open whether someone denied a benefit simply for being unmarried has a claim (43 N.Y.3d at 377).

Treated less well, not severe or pervasive

Under federal law, harassment is unlawful only if it is severe or pervasive. The City law does not use that test. The question is whether you were “treated less well than other employees because of” your gender, race, age or other protected characteristic; how severe or frequent the conduct was goes to how much you recover, not to whether the employer is liable (Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 76–78; Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110).

The employer has a defense: it avoids liability if it proves that what happened was “nothing more than what a reasonable victim of discrimination would consider ‘petty slights and trivial inconveniences’” (Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 80). The burden of proving that is on the employer, and a single comment can be enough for liability depending on its context (Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 111).

Two limits. The City law is “not a general civility code”: a boss who is rude to everyone is not discriminating, and you still have to show that you were treated worse at least in part because of a protected characteristic (Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110). And courts still dismiss cases that could only be read as petty slights, as the First Department did in Williams.

The same approach applies to other unfair treatment, not just harassment. You do not need to show a “materially adverse” change in your job, “but only that [you were] subject to an unfavorable change or treated less well than other employees on the basis of a protected characteristic” (Golston-Green, 184 A.D.3d at 38). In that case the Second Department reinstated a police sergeant’s gender harassment claim based in part on her commander’s statement that he did not “like women on this job because they have babies,” and dismissed her other claims.

New York State law has moved toward the City standard. Since 2019 the State law makes harassment unlawful “regardless of whether such harassment would be considered severe or pervasive,” with a similar petty-slights defense (Exec. Law § 296(1)(h)). The two laws are not identical, and the City law still has to be analyzed separately.

What characteristics are protected?

An employer may not refuse to hire you, fire you, or discriminate against you in pay or in the “terms, conditions or privileges of employment” because of your actual or perceived:

age, race, creed, color, national origin, gender, disability, marital status, partnership status, caregiver status, sexual and reproductive health decisions, sexual orientation, uniformed service, height, weight, or immigration or citizenship status (Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a)).

“Perceived” matters: you are protected if the employer acted because it believed you had a characteristic, even if you do not. The law also separately protects you from discrimination because of:

• your relationship or association with someone, because of that person’s race, creed, color, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, uniformed service or immigration or citizenship status (§ 8-107(20));
• being unemployed, when you apply for a job (§ 8-107(21));
• being a victim of domestic violence, a sex offense or stalking (§ 8-107(27)).

Protections that only New York City has

Some of these exist in weaker form in State law. As written in the City code, each goes further than anything else that applies in New York.

Caregiver status

You may not be treated worse because you provide direct and ongoing care for a minor child, or for a relative or member of your household who has a disability and relies on you for medical care or daily needs (§§ 8-102, 8-107(1)(a)). This protects you from being treated worse; the law does not list caregiving among the needs an employer must accommodate. See caring for a family member.

Height and weight

Added to the list of protected characteristics in 2023. There are narrow exceptions, for example where a law requires the employer to consider height or weight (§ 8-107(1)(g)).

Credit history

An employer may not ask for or use your consumer credit history in hiring or employment decisions (§ 8-107(24)(a)). The exceptions are specific: jobs where a law or a securities self-regulatory organization requires a credit check, police and peace officers, jobs that must be bonded or require a security clearance, non-clerical jobs with regular access to trade secrets or national security information, jobs with signatory authority over third-party funds or assets of $10,000 or more, and jobs that can modify digital security systems (§ 8-107(24)(b)).

Salary history

An employer may not ask about your current or past pay, or search records to find it, and may not rely on it to set your pay when hiring you (§ 8-107(25)(b)). It may discuss what you expect to be paid, including unvested equity or deferred compensation you would lose by leaving your current job (§ 8-107(25)(c)). If you volunteer your pay history without being prompted, the employer may consider it and verify it (§ 8-107(25)(d)). The rule does not apply to internal transfers or promotions with your current employer (§ 8-107(25)(e)(2)).

Pay ranges in job ads

An ad for a job, promotion or transfer must state the minimum and maximum salary or hourly wage the employer in good faith believes it would pay (§ 8-107(32)(a)). The rule does not cover temporary help firms’ ads for temporary work or jobs that cannot or will not be performed, at least in part, in the City (§ 8-107(32)(b)). Only a current employee can sue over it, and only over an ad by their own employer for a job, promotion or transfer with that employer; anyone else can complain to the City Commission (§ 8-107(32)(c)).

Criminal records: the Fair Chance Act

An employer may not ask about or search for your arrest or conviction record until after it has made you a conditional offer (§ 8-107(11-a)(a)(3)). If it then wants to withdraw the offer because of your record, it must give you a written copy of its inquiry, ask you for information about the relevant “fair chance factors,” analyze them, give you that analysis in writing with the documents it relied on, and give you at least five business days to respond while holding the job open (§ 8-107(11-a)(b)). Separate rules limit what it can do about a pending arrest or a conviction during employment (§ 8-107(10)), and it may never ask about a non-pending arrest or sealed matter where State law forbids it (§ 8-107(11)). Police, peace officers, law enforcement agencies and jobs where another law requires a background check are largely excluded (§ 8-107(11-a)(g)).

Marijuana testing

Most employers may not require a job applicant to be tested for marijuana as a condition of employment. The exceptions include police and peace officers, jobs requiring a commercial driver’s license, jobs supervising or caring for children, medical patients or vulnerable people, certain construction site safety jobs, other jobs designated as affecting health or safety, and testing required by federal or State law, federal contracts or a collective bargaining agreement (§ 8-107(31)).

Reasonable accommodation and the cooperative dialogue

The City law requires an employer to reasonably accommodate a disability it knew or should have known about (§ 8-107(15)(a)), a pregnancy or related condition (§ 8-107(22)), your religious observance (§ 8-107(3)), and needs arising from being a victim of domestic violence, a sex offense or stalking (§ 8-107(27)(b)). The pregnancy provision also requires a lactation room and a written lactation policy (§ 8-107(22)(b)–(c)). The employer must prove undue hardship; you do not have to prove its absence (§ 8-102, definition of “reasonable accommodation”).

The cooperative dialogue. When you ask for an accommodation, or the employer has notice that you may need one, it must engage in a good-faith “cooperative dialogue” with you within a reasonable time: a discussion, written or oral, about your needs, possible accommodations including alternatives, and any difficulties they would pose (§§ 8-102, 8-107(28)(a)). When the dialogue ends, the employer must give you a written final decision identifying any accommodation granted or denied (§ 8-107(28)(d)). It may not conclude that no accommodation is available until it has had, or tried to have, that dialogue (§ 8-107(28)(e)). Failing to engage in the dialogue is a violation in itself, separate from any failure to accommodate (§ 8-107(28)(a), (f)).

The Court of Appeals has held that the City law “unquestionably forecloses summary judgment where the employer has not engaged in a good faith interactive process regarding a specifically requested accommodation” (Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d 824, 837–38 (2014), reinstating a disability claim). But the dialogue has to actually fall short: the First Department dismissed a cooperative dialogue claim where the employee had used the employer’s approved appeals process and did not show how it failed the State or City standard (Cronemeyer v City of New York, 248 A.D.3d 432, 432–33 (1st Dep’t 2026)).

For how to ask, and what to put in writing, see how to ask for a reasonable accommodation and working with a medical condition.

Retaliation

It is unlawful to retaliate “in any manner” against someone who has opposed discrimination, filed a complaint, testified or helped in an investigation, or requested a reasonable accommodation (Admin. Code § 8-107(7)). The retaliation does not have to be a firing or a demotion, or any “materially adverse change” in your job. It has to be “reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity” (§ 8-107(7)).

You do not have to use the word “discrimination.” In Albunio a police commander was criticized by her superior for having recommended an officer the superior was hostile to because he perceived him as gay. She answered that the officer “was the better candidate” and that she would recommend him again. She never said the word discrimination, but the Court of Appeals held that a jury could find she had opposed it, and upheld her verdict (16 N.Y.3d at 478–79). The Second Circuit held that rejecting a supervisor’s advances and telling him his conduct was “offensive and shameful” could be protected opposition, and that public humiliation and being shunned could deter someone from complaining (Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 115–16).

The limit: you still need evidence connecting what happened to your complaint. In Williams the retaliation claim failed because coworkers who had not complained got the same assignments (61 A.D.3d at 71–72).

Who is responsible: the company, your manager, your coworkers

The company is responsible for its managers and supervisors. An employer is liable for discrimination by an employee who “exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility” (§ 8-107(13)(b)(1)). It is also liable for a coworker’s discrimination if it knew and acquiesced or failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action, or should have known and did not use reasonable diligence to prevent it (§ 8-107(13)(b)(2)–(3)). The federal defense that lets an employer escape liability for a supervisor’s harassment by showing it had an anti-harassment policy the employee did not use does not apply to City law claims. For a supervisor’s conduct, a good policy can reduce penalties and punitive damages, but not your compensatory damages or legal fees (Zakrzewska v New School, 14 N.Y.3d 469, 479–81 (2010)).

Individuals can be personally liable, but only for what they did. A supervisor, owner or coworker is not your “employer” under the City law. Each may be liable for their own discriminatory conduct, for aiding and abetting discrimination by others, or for retaliation (Doe, 36 N.Y.3d at 459; Admin. Code § 8-107(1), (6), (7)). In that case the Court of Appeals, 6–1, affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the company’s founder personally. The appeal concerned only whether he could be liable as an “employer”; claims that he discriminated himself were not before it. Aiding and abetting requires an underlying violation: if there was no discrimination, no one can have helped it happen (Cronemeyer, 248 A.D.3d at 433).

What can I recover?

• In court: damages with no cap, including lost pay and compensation for emotional harm, plus punitive damages and injunctive relief (Admin. Code § 8-502(a)). The Court of Appeals has held that punitive damages under the City law require “willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or a ‘conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard,’” a lower standard than federal law, but still more than a finding of discrimination (Chauca v Abraham, 30 N.Y.3d 325, 329, 331–34 (2017)). Punitive damages are not available against the City of New York itself: the law’s general reference to punitive damages does not waive the City’s immunity from them (Krohn v New York City Police Dept., 2 N.Y.3d 329, 334–38 (2004), unanimous).
• Legal fees. A court may award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, expert fees and costs, at Manhattan rates, and a worker whose lawsuit caused the employer to change its policy counts as prevailing even without a judgment (§ 8-502(g)).
• At the City Commission: back pay, front pay, compensatory damages and attorney’s fees, among other remedies (§ 8-120). The Commission’s list of remedies does not include punitive damages; a court can award them.

What are the deadlines?

These are general periods, not a date for your case. When a period starts depends on the facts.

New York City Commission on Human Rights

One year (Admin. Code § 8-109(e)). For gender-based harassment, three years after the harassing conduct (§ 8-109(e)).

City Human Rights Law, in court

Three years (Admin. Code § 8-502(d)), paused while a complaint is pending with the City Commission or the State Division, and while a court reviews the dismissal of that complaint.

Within 10 days of suing

If you sue under the City law, you must serve a copy of your complaint on the City Commission and the City’s Corporation Counsel within 10 days (§ 8-502(c)).

Choosing an agency can close the courthouse. Filing with the State Division or the City Commission can bar a later lawsuit on the same claim (Exec. Law § 297(9); Admin. Code § 8-502(a)). Decide where to file before you file. Two exceptions: a charge you file with the EEOC that the EEOC refers to the State or City agency does not count as choosing the agency (§ 8-502(a)), and if the agency dismisses your complaint for administrative convenience, you generally keep the right to sue (§ 8-502(b)). It works the other way too: once you have filed a lawsuit, the City Commission cannot take the same grievance unless the lawsuit was dismissed or withdrawn without prejudice (§ 8-109(f)).

A contract cannot shorten these periods. Since May 11, 2024, a term in an employment-related agreement that shortens the time to file with the City Commission or to sue under the City law is “unenforceable and void as against public policy” (§§ 8-109(e-1), 8-502(d-1)). How that applies to agreements signed before that date, and to arbitration deadlines, is not settled; see the notes for lawyers.

For the State and federal periods that usually run alongside these, see New York employment claim deadlines. The federal EEOC deadline, generally 300 days in New York, is much shorter.

Which court, and does it matter?

A City law case filed in State court is decided on appeal by the Appellate Division for the county where it is filed: the First Department for Manhattan and the Bronx, the Second Department for Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island. See which court decides my case.

On the core standards on this page, the two Departments agree. The First Department set out the “treated less well” approach in Williams, and the Second Department applies the same approach in Golston-Green. They also agree that the Transit Authority is covered (Tang; Center for Independence of the Disabled), and the First Department has held the same for the MTA. Where they may differ is on narrower points that have not reached both courts. If your case turns on one of those, where you file can matter, and the notes for lawyers track the questions that are open.

If your case is in federal court, usually because it also includes a federal claim, the City claim still gets the City standard (Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 109), though federal procedure, including federal summary judgment, applies (715 F.3d at 111–12).

What should I gather?

• The dates of what happened, in order, and the names of the people involved.
• Emails, texts and chat messages, especially any comments about your protected characteristic, saved somewhere you control and that you are allowed to keep.
• Anything you sent complaining about the treatment, and anything you got back.
• Any accommodation request and the employer’s written decision, or a note that you never received one.
• How coworkers outside your protected group were treated in the same situation.
• How many people work for the employer, including contractors, if it is a small business.
• Any agreement you signed about arbitration or deadlines.
• Your pay records, and the job ad if the pay range is an issue.

Short answers

• Does the City law cover my employer?
• Does harassment have to be severe or pervasive?
• Can my boss be personally liable?
• Does the City law protect freelancers, contractors and interns?
• What counts as retaliation?
• What is the cooperative dialogue?
• Can an employer ask my salary history or check my credit?
• When can an employer ask about my criminal record?
• Does a job ad have to include the pay?
• What are the deadlines?